Madisonian Multiculturalism by Natapoff, Alexandra
MADISONIAN MULTICULTURALISM
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF*
I. A MADISONIAN APPROACH TO RACE
In 1788, James Madison mulled over the enormous burdens that
diversity imposes on a nation's ability to forge political harmony.'
After mourning the destructive impact of competing political factions,
Madison offered his now-classic diagnosis:
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction:
the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence;
the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that
it is worse than the disease. ... The second expedient is as
impracticable as the first would be unwise.... The latent causes
of faction are thus sown in the nature of man.'
Madison concluded that diversity and difference, or in his words,
factionalism, were inevitable characteristics of a free society. "The
inference to which we are brought," he reasoned, "is, that the causes
of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in
the means of controlling its effects," 3 and that factionalism lies at the
heart of politics itself. "The regulation of these various and interfer-
ing interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and
involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary
operations of the government."4
* Attorney, Washington, D.C.;J.D., Stanford Law Schoo4 1995. Special thanks to Dean
Jamin Raskin, Professor Mark Kelman, and Caitlin Halligan.
This Essay is based in part on an article by the same author, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection
and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflic 47 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1995), and on comments
made at the Washington College of Law Conference.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 16-17 (James Madison) (Ray Fairfield ed., 1987).
2. Id. at 17-18.
3. I& at 19 (emphasis omitted).
4. Id at 18.
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Madison's theory of faction contains a valuable lesson for modem-
day racial politics about the importance of accommodating the
political expression of minority group interests. There are at least
thirty recognized racial minority groups that currently make up
twenty-five percent of the United States' population, and at least
eleven major U.S. cities are already majority-minority. By the year
2050, African Americans will no longer be the largest racial minority
and the United States will be a majority-minority nation.6 While
whites will still constitute the largest single racial group, and presum-
ably continue to benefit from a legacy of economic and social
hegemony, the very notions of "majority" and "minority" will
necessarily evolve along with the changing racial makeup of the
nation.7
Madison's analyses suggest that, given these burgeoning groups and
shifting interests, race-based factionalism may be an inevitable part of
this increasingly diverse American body politic. While Madison
himself clearly did not contemplate race as a source of political
factionalism and his insights may not map with perfect precision onto
modem racial politics, race today is an important political determi-
nant that inspires significant factional interest-group jockeying, not
only between whites and minorities, but between different groups of
color.8 This state of affairs poses a strong challenge to the Supreme
Court's current color-blind position that all racially explicit legislation
is an illegitimate expression of racial animus and, more fundamental-
5. See William P. O'Hare, America's Minorities-The Demographics ofDiversity, POPULATION
BULL., Dec. 1992, at 1, 9-25 (identifying sub-groups within minority populations and listing race
and ethnicity statistics for 20 largest U.S. cities).
6. id. at 2. Latinos are expected to surpass African Americans in number around the year
2010. Id.
7. See id. at 25 (noting that majority-minority ratios will shift in certain cities where whites
will lose their majority status over next few years).
8. Theoretically speaking, race can be understood alternatively as a form of prepolitical,
immutable identity or as a set of political, social, historical, and thus in some sense contingent,
interests. The first approach underlies the Supreme Court's color-blind jurisprudence, which
asserts that political classifications based on racial identity are nothing more than constitutionally
illegitimate stereotypes. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993). The second
anti-essentialist approach treats race as a historical, politicized aspect of identity whose character
is tied to the distribution of power. See, e.g., MICHAEL OM! & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATIoN IN THE UNITED STATES 53-76 (2d ed. 1994); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping theMargins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1993).
This latter version most closely resembles Madison's concept of political faction because it posits
the ability to change the power relationships and political interests associated with racial identity
and recognizes that the meaning of group membership can change over time. This Essay adopts
a somewhat intermediate approach by assuming that the meaning of racial categories can
change but that, at a given moment, relatively determinate racial identities exist. The Essay
takes this position in part because the Court relies on such categories, but more importandy
because even if racial categories are socially constructed they are real for the people who
experience them.
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ly, that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to eliminate or
at least suppress the racial factionalism that spawns such legislation.
If, as Madison suggests, some racial factionalism is bound to exist as
long as there is racial difference, the Supreme Court's bar on explicit
race-based politicking is not only unrealistic but disproportionately
hurtful to minority groups for whom the possibility of victory in the
legislative arena might well increase the majority's political responsive-
ness to minority concerns.
In Madisonian terms, then, our laws and system of governance
should be grappling with how to accommodate the increasing diversity
of the body politic by ensuring that all racial groups participate
equally and without structural disability. In part, this entails acknowl-
edging and controlling the effects of factional competition between
different minority groups in light of the continued cultural and
economic dominance of the white majority, precisely because factional
competition among minority groups strengthens the power of the
majority.' The task demands not only a recognition of the role
played by race in interest group politics"° but heightened sensitivity
to racial differences beyond black and white."
Last Term, however, the Supreme Court ignored Madison's warning
about the inevitability of faction and took aim at race itself as if to
eliminate one of the great causes of faction in American history. In
three major decisions, on voting rights," affirmative action, 3 and
school desegregation, 14 the Court reiterated its color-blind jurispru-
dential stance and its hostility to the ways in which legislation and
9. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 18-19 (charging government with duty of
fostering coexistence offactions). Professor Charles Lawrence poses the question of accommo-
dating diversity and mitigating factional competition in this way: "In what different, complex,
and interrelated ways is the experience of each [minority] group related to the maintenance of
white supremacy? .... [This] is very different from asking whether one group has been more
disadvantaged or more victimized than another." Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race,
Multicuturaism, and theJurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L REV. 819,826 (1995) (citations
omitted).
10. The tension between the liberal, individual-rights-based model and more group-oriented
representational theories is beyond the scope of this Essay, although it is a central theme in the
longstanding debate over the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause for minority groups. See,
e.g., William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 775 (1979) (advocating an individualistic approach to race and affirmative action).
11. For analyses of many of the thorny issues raised by equal protection rights in a
multiracial society, see Symposium: Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819
(1995).
12. Millerv.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,2489-94 (1995) (holding that Georgia's congressional
redistricting plan creating majority-black district violated Equal Protection Clause).
13. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995) (holding that
government contract awarded to disadvantaged business enterprise on basis of minority group
racial classification warranted strict scrutiny).
14. Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2055-56 (1995) (holding that remedial measures
seeking to desegregate Kansas City, Missouri schools were overbroad).
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public policy speak overtly to racial inequality. The Court implied, for
example, that alleviating racial inequality is an illegitimate basis for
public collective action through legislation where such legislation
reflects the majority's impulse to remedy past discrimination or where
it embodies a disfavored minority's struggle for economic or political
inclusion. 5 The Court also reasserted its longstanding position that
the equal protection mandate does not authorize the redistribution
of economic and other social goods on the basis of race, even where
such redistribution directly eases racial inequality.16
These decisions reflect a common theme of hostility toward the
official recognition of race, racial difference, racial discrimination, or
racial inequality. The Court has reasoned that race consciousness
causes racial factionalism, and in particular, that racially sensitive
legislation such as the Voting Rights Act17 and small business set-
asides exacerbate and even create rather than alleviate racial
divisiveness. 8 Perhaps Justice Scalia best articulated the Court's
desire to eliminate race consciousness when he denied racial
difference altogether. "In the eyes of government," he wrote, "we are
just one race here. It is American."'" More fundamentally, the
Court's assertions taken together imply that racial factionalism itself is
the evil at which the Equal Protection Clause is aimed, and not
historic discrimination, exclusion, or inequality."
Madison's theory that factional differences are not only inevitable
but that their interplay actually produces a vibrant body politic2"
strongly undermines the Supreme Court's reasoning. In Madisonian
15. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491-92; City of Richmond v. JA
Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989). By contrast, John Hart Ely has argued that equal
protection concerns are not implicated when majority chooses to disadvantage itself. JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 170-71 (1980).
16. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2054; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973).
17. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973, to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
18. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
19. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. See Mille, 115 S. Ct. at 2486; Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
It is important to note that while the Court's equal protection decisions ostensibly deal only
with constitutional and not statutory remedies for racial inequality, they limit all forms of race-
based legislation. The Court increasingly treats the Equal Protection Clause not as a floor for
the protection of minority rights but as a ceiling on the scope of permissible remedies. Thus
the Equal Protection Clause now limits the power of the state and federal government to
institute affirmative action, the power of the federal district courts to desegregate public schools,
and the scope of the Voting Rights Act. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995) (federal affirmative action); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(state affirmative action); Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (school desegregation);
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (Voting Rights Act); see also infra text accompanying
notes 39-51 (providing overview of Supreme Courtjurisprudence as it relates to race and class).
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 18.
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terms, the Court can no more eliminate race-based political interests
than it can "giv[e] to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests." 22 Instead, the task of the Court
and legislators alike should be to ameliorate the effects of racial
faction, which would mean restraining the ability of one faction to
exclude and discriminate against another in ways that create structural
inequality.23 Madison believed that a successful system of republican
government would
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.24
In an era where "playing the race card" has become a political term
of art, Madison's prescriptions should be understood to apply to white
racism as to other forms of pluralistic majoritarian tyranny.
Madison paid close attention to the special and dangerous role
played by the majority faction:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its
sinister views by regular vote.... When a majority is included in
a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand,
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the
public good and the rights of other citizens.'
The lesson here is that concerted political action by the majority is
more fearsome than that of minority groups which, by virtue of the
structure of the political system itself, can wreak only limited havoc on
the rights of others. This suggests that, contrary to the Court's
current position, it sometimes may be appropriate to treat whites as
a group differently under an equal protection analysis, precisely
because they constitute a numeric and historic majority with the
ability to distort the political process and control the definition of the
common good.2" In this sense, then, the Voting Rights Act, race-
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 17.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 18 (identifying regulation of competing
interests as primary task of legislation).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 22; see also ELY, supra note 15, at 153 (equating
white racial prejudice with Madison's majoritarian "common motive").
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 19.
26. See United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) (finding that Hasidic Jews
were part of white majority and therefore could not claim vote dilution when their community
was split between voting districts). But see Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829-30 (1993)
(holding that whites are entitled to same rights under Equal Protection Clause as racial
minorities and therefore that white voters could bring vote-dilution claim). The issue of white
status will necessarily become more complex when, by mid-century, whites no longer constitute
a numeric majority. See O'Hare, supra note 5, at 2.
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based economic preferences, school desegregation measures, and
antidiscrimination laws that aim to equalize the participatory power
of racial minorities should be seen as Madisonian salve on this
nation's factional wounds.
The Court's new voting rights cases, however, conclude otherwise.
They hold that legislative increases in minority political power pursuant
to the Voting Rights Act offend broader interests of political
harmony.27 Justice Kennedy, for example, asserted that "Jr]ace-
based assignments ... cause society serious harm"28 and that
"'[r] acial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.
Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from
the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters."'29
According to this reasoning, governmental racial classifications that
empower minority groups should be rejected because they exacerbate
latent factional tendencies. Madison teaches, however, that factional
difference is a natural and inevitable aspect of a free society, and that
governmental policies that mitigate its effects-such as giving
minorities the power to counter majoritarian tyranny-are not only
proper but actually necessary for the continued functioning of a
diverse body politic.
In sum, the Court's commitment to a color-blind jurisprudence
clashes with Madison's directive to accommodate factional diversity.
As the nation grows increasingly diverse, the costs of this posture can
only increase because it prevents our representative system from
reflecting changes in the legitimate interests of its constituent groups.
More fundamentally, it makes it even harder for minorities as
individuals and in groups to participate in the political arena on a
truly equal footing.
Another result of the Court's color-blind jurisprudence is that
different minority groups are more likely to be forced to compete
with each other, rather than with the white majority, for a shrinking
pie of race-based goods and preferences."0 In a recent voting rights
27. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995) (characterizing race-based
assignments as harmful to society); Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 (criticizing racial classifications
designed to increase minority voting power).
28. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
29. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2832 (1993)).
30. Although an analysis of the economic, social, and political sources of such conflict is
beyond the scope of this Essay, others have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note
9, at 826 (identifying white supremacy as source of inter-minority group conflict); James
Jennings, New Demographics and Ethnic Challenges to Racial Hierarchy in the United States, 19 SAGE
RACE REL ABsmAcrs 19, 23, 26 (1994) (warning against mass media sensationalization of inter-
minority group conflict and analyzing some of its structural sources).
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case, for example, a federal district court in Dade County, Florida,
found under the Voting Rights Act that African-American and Latino
plaintiffs were each entitled to an additional voting district."'
Because only one such district-either African American or Lati-
no-could be drawn, the federal district court found the remedies for
the two communities to be mutually exclusive and left the offending
districting plan in place.3 2 The very aim of the Voting Rights
Act-to ameliorate minority vote dilution-was thus discarded, to the
benefit of Florida's white majority.33
In an even more complex case involving San Francisco's Lowell
High School, Chinese Americans have been pitted against African
Americans and Latilios for admission to the 'competitive magnet
school.' Under the terms of a longstanding desegregation consent
decree, Lowell High has repeatedly raised the admission standards for
Chinese applicants in order to cap their enrollment numbers because
their test scores are so high.35 If the Chinese American student
plaintiffs succeed in their current legal challenge to the consent
decree, they will most likely eliminate an antidiscrimination remedy
intended to benefit people of color and, more specifically, one to
which African-American and Latino students are still legally entitled.
In effect, the racial preference expressed in the consent decree has
become a ceiling on minority group achievement, rather than a
protective floor, because all groups of color, no matter how differently
situated, are forced to compete with each other for the racially-
designated places. This outcome appears jurisprudentially inevitable
unless the Supreme Court was willing to recognize the different
historical postures of whites and people of color with respect to the
desegregation process and the possibility that different groups of
color might have different desegregation needs. Because the Court's
color-blind posture denies the relevance of interminority group
difference and factional competition, however, we lack even the
jurisprudential vocabulary to describe the complex political, historical,
and economic conflicts between African American, Latino, Asian, and
31. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550 (N.D. Fla. 1992), affid in par4 rev'd in part sub
nom. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
32. Md at 1579-80 (noting that creation of voting district in favor of either group would
adversely affect other group).
33. Id at 1572. The Supreme Court affirmed this aspect of the decision without comment
because it found no vote dilution and thus no need for a remedy. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114
S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
34. For an exhaustive analysis of the Lowell High School controversy and its constitutional
implications, see Selena Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination
Against Asian-Americans And Preeving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
35. Id. at 1030-34.
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white factions in a constitutionally meaningful and sensitive way. As
a result, the initial concerns underlying the consent decree-the
denial of quality education to students of color-falls by the wayside.
In a final example, efforts to desegregate San Francisco's public
housing have turned the very concept of desegregation upside down.
The San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA) has been attempting to
satisfy its obligation to eliminate racially identifiable housing projects
by moving poor Southeast Asian and Latino tenants into predomi-
nantly African-American projects. 6 The results have included
increased tension, reduced integration, and even violence by African
Americans against Southeast Asians,' without improving the quality
of life in public housing or increasing the political access of public
housing tenants. One reason for this counterproductive development
is that the Court's color-blind jurisprudence denies the constitutional
relevance of the historical, political, and economic advantages held by
the white majority; San Francisco's obligation to desegregate therefore
can be constitutionally satisfied by, as one housing advocate described
it, "moving different colored bodies from one side of town to the
other,""8 without ever asking whether white communities or resourc-
es should be involved.
In such cases of inter-minority group conflict and the failure of
traditional remedies, a more Madisonian analysis would suggest that
the claims of different minority factions should be assessed not only
against each other but in light of an overall aim of reducing
majoritarian factional tyranny, 9  Absent such an analysis, the
competing claims of minority groups ironically may prevent the
underlying harms of racial discrimination and exclusion from being
addressed at all.
II. RACE, CLASS, AND TIE PROBLEM WIm PROXIES
Despite the existence of growing African-American, Latino, and
Asian-American middle classes, there is a well documented link
36. Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the
Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 947 (1995).
37. Id. at 947-49; Jim Doyle, Asians File Rights Suit Against S.F.: Complaint Accuses Housing
Authority of Ignoring Pleas for Help, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1993, at A13.
38. Gen Fujioka, Staff Attorney, Asian Law Caucus, Presentation at San Francisco Human
Rights Commission Public Hearing, Integrating Public Housing. Fostering Positive Ethnic/Racial
Relations (Mar. 1, 1995) (on file with author); see also Gen Fujioka, Turning the Tide of Terror and
Indifference, AsiAN LAW CAUCUS REP., Oct. 1994 1, 1-3 (describing efforts of community activists
to improve conditions in San Francisco's public housing).
39. See THE FEDERAuSr No. 10, supra note 1, at 19 (characterizing challenge of republican
form of government as securing public good and private rights against dangers of majoritarian
factionalism while simultaneously preserving spirit of popular government).
758
1996] MADISONIAN MULTICULTURALISM
between racial minority group status and poverty." So much so that
many scholars and politicians advocate income-based rather than race-
based programs as a way of alleviating racial inequality, although
others counter that class alone cannot account for the disadvantages
experienced by racial minorities.41
In light of the debate over the relationship between race and class,
it is instructive to note that Madison focused on wealth and the
unequal distribution of property as the primary source of political
factionalism.42 The Supreme Court has long held, however, that
class is not a constitutionally cognizable category.' Indeed, the
Court treats the distribution of wealth as the quintessential political
issue about which the Constitution has nothing to say.4 By contrast,
the Court's recent cases identify race as an issue unfit for political
resolution. Any law containing an explicit recognition of race, no
matter how legitimately promulgated or beneficial to racial minorities,
warrants the heaviest of judicial pressure-strict scrutiny.
This "strict scrutiny," and its "strict in theory but fatal in fact"
application,4 effectively prohibits minority racial groups from using
traditional interest group politics to improve their lot. While farmers,
teachers, cigarette companies, labor unions, and the National Rifle
Association alike can, at least in theory, push facially self-serving
legislation through Congress and local legislatures, African-Americans,
40. O'Hare, supra note 5, at 28-39 (documenting educational, occupational, and income
disparities between whites and minority groups). For example, 14% of African Americans and
10% of Latinos are college graduates as compared with 28% of whites; the median net worth
of whites is about 10 times that of blacks and Latinos; and 33% of African Americans live below
the poverty line as compared to 9% of whites. Id.
41. Compare WILLIAM JULUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTiTUTIONS 1-2, 144-54 (2d ed. 1980) (attributing development of black
underclass primarily to economic factors) with DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 1-16 (1993) (arguing
that urban segregation and accompanying economic disadvantage cannot be explained without
acknowledging racism).
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 18. Madison's great fear was that the
unpropertied majority might seek to exercise its numeric power to redistribute wealth away from
property holders. See id, at 19 (envisioning overtaxation of property holders for benefit of
majority). His insights into majoritarian tyranny, however, are not limited to that particular
scenario.
43. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 39 (1973) (holding that
poverty is not suspect class and that differences in wealth do not trigger heightened scrutiny
under Equal Protection Clause).
44. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 642-43 (1986) (upholding decreases and denials of
food stamps allotment); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (holding that state may
impose maximum limit on welfare benefits).
45. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); cf.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'") (citations omitted).
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Latinos, and Asian Americans may not. Justice Stevens bemoaned the
irony of this particular legal development when he wrote that "racial
minorities should not be less eligible than other groups to benefit
from districting plans the majority designs to aid them."4" Handi-
capped in the give-and-take of legislative bargaining, racial minorities
must rely increasingly heavily on the courts in order to craft racially
explicit remedies for the disadvantaged. By contrast, while the poor
as a group do not operate under any such constitutional handicap,
they must compete in the political marketplace with no help from the
courts at all.
The effect of the Court's dual treatment of race and class is to burn
the candle of racial inequality at both ends. On the one hand, cases
such as Adarand and City of Richmond v. JA. Croson, Co." require
people of color seeking beneficial legislation to find legislative proxies
for race such as poverty, residence, educational attainment, or in the
small business context, size.4" Such decisions pressure people of
color with common interests to express those interests legislatively in
terms of these nonracial proxies, which are constitutionally permissi-
ble classifications, in order to mitigate the economic, political, and
social manifestations of racism and racial exclusion.49
Simultaneously, however, the Court asserts that these proxies
cannot be used judicially to identify racial discrimination or to craft
remedies. District courts battling school segregation, for example,
may not use the proxies of poverty or educational attainment to
alleviate racial inequality in education between cities and suburbs."0
Courts may not use the proxy of de facto residential segregation to
46. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2499 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
47. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
48. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (instructing lower court to determine whether there was
any consideration of "race-neutral" alternatives to set-aside); City of Richmond v.JA. Croson,
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 471 (1989) (noting that city did not consider any "alternative, race-neutral
means to minority participation").
Likewise, the Court in Miller determined that race by itself does not constitute a legitimate
.communit[y] of interest." Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court cited the lower court's finding
that"[t]he evidence was compelling that there are no tangible communities of interest spanning
the hundreds of miles of the Eleventh District." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The
majority thus effectively denied that, as noted by the dissent, "ethnicity itself can tie people
together." Id at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
49. Of course, there is no constitutional prohibition against people of color forming
political coalitions based on shared racial interests. Those coalitions, however, are prohibited
from instantiating those interests in racially explicit legislation.
50. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2051 (1995) (noting that the district court
cannot do indirectly what it lacks authority to do directly); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (upholding local school funding scheme that resulted in
lower quality schools for communities of color).
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strike down racially exclusionary zoning laws.5' Courts cannot rely
on the proxy of statistical disparities in the workplace to combat
employment discrimination without a showing of discriminatory
intent. 2 In other words, the Court has declared racial proxies to be
ineffective constitutional tools for racial equalization, even as the
Court indicates in other ways that they may be the only tools left.
People of color, whose disadvantage is rooted both in racial
discrimination and economic exclusion, have thus been thrown back
into the political marketplace with a severe handicap. On the one
hand, economic disadvantage and other proxies for race do not
provide a basis for heightened judicial protection. On the other, the
Court has identified race as an impermissible legislative tool with which
to remedy the effects of discrimination. In other words, not only do
the courts now offer less redress for manifest racial disadvantage, but
the Equal Protection Clause now hampers people of color from using
the representative process to forge beneficial legislation that might
counter that disadvantage by other means.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has imposed a color-blind mandate on an
increasingly multicultural, racially diverse body politic. In so doing,
it has curtailed the ability of people of color to use interest group
politics as a way of lessening racial inequality, challenging discrimina-
tion, and crafting political compromise. Madison's theory of faction,
however, suggests a more structural and potentially inclusive approach
to managing our increasing diversity. Instead of insisting that any
acknowledgement of racial difference represents a political and
constitutional failure, the Court should incorporate Madison's
pragmatic structural approach to faction and try to open up the
political process to racial minorities, even while recognizing the
persistent danger of white majoritarian tyranny. Ironically, as our
nation grows increasingly diverse, the deeply flawed democratic
process that once justified slavery and Jim Crow may turn out to be
the only viable source of racial healing.
51. SeeVillage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,270-71
(1977) (upholding zoning scheme that functioned to exclude people of color).
52. SeeWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,247-48 (1976) (requiring showing of discriminato-
ry intent in constitutional challenge to use of employment test that effectively excluded African-
American applicants). Statistical disparities may, however, be used as evidence of discriminatory
intent and Title VII permits disparate impact claims. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact claim under Title VII).
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